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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
RANDALL BRYANT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-vsJOHN TURNER, Warden of the Utah State
Prison,
Defendant-Respondent.

Case No.
10757

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
Appellant, Randall Bryant, appeals from a judgment of the District Court of the Third Judicial District denying relief sought under original Habeas
Corpus proceedings.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On February 21, 1964, Randall Bryant plead
guilty to the crime of murder in the second degree
(Exhibit D-23). Bryant was oiiginaly charged with
murder in the first degree arising out of the death of
his wife from gunshot wounds. He was sentenced
by Judge C. Nelson Day, Fifth Judicial District, to an
indeterminate term of ten years to life in the Utah
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State Prison. Commitment issued March 10, 1964.
Bryant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in
the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District about
February 8th, 1966 (Exhibit D-7). The petition was
denied and dismissed (Exhibit D-11). On June 28,
1966, Bryant again filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus (R-7). A hearing was held on this petition on
September 1st and September 23rd, 1966 before
Third District Judge Leonard W. Elton. A judgment
was entered October 21, 1966, dismissing and denying this petition (R-64). From this judgment appellant
seeks a reversal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits that the judgment
should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Respondent basically agrees with the facts
pertinent to the issues on appeal. Respondent however points out some additional facts omitted by appellant.
On page 3 of appellant's brief reference is made
to a letter sent from Dr. Roger Kiger, Senior Psychiatrist at the Utah State Hospital, to Judge C. Nelson
Day. This letter, dated October 21, 1963, stated in
part:
It is the opinion of our clinical staff that [appellan~]
is psychotic or "insane" as a result of the organic
brain damage he suffered to the cerebral vascular
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hemorrhage he experienced some fourteen months
ago.

The above statement was greatly modW3d, if
not wholly repudiated by Dr. Kiger during his testimony at hearing in the instant case where he agreed
the opinion expressed in the letter was "too hasty",
and not supported by further examinations. (R. 229).
Note also Exhibit D-14, a letter from Dr. Kiger to appellant's attorney, where Dr. Kiger characterizes the
letter as having been written somewhat prematurely.
Respondent also points out a statement on page
22 of appellant's brief (contained in his statement
of facts), where appellant argues that the transcript
of the proceedings at the mental hearings are the
best evidence of the factors weighed by Judge C.
Nelson Day in reaching his decision. Respondent
does not agree with appellant's placement of the
statement in the brief or the statement itself.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED
PELLANT'S PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS.

AP~

This being an appeal from an order of the Third
District Court denying relief sought under habeas
corpus, the scope of the inquiry on appeal is limited
to the discovery of substantial evidence in the record upon which the trial court could have based its
ruling. {Ward v. Turner, 12 Utah 2d 210, 366 Pac 2d
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72, Cert. denied 371 U.S. 872 (1961); Gallegos v. Turner 17 Utah 2d 386 (1965); Scott v. Beckstead 13 Utah
2d 428, 375 Pac 2d 767 (1962).) The verified complaint
and amended petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus
(R-5) alleges a deficiency in the proceedings held
in the Fifth Judicial District to determine the mental
capacities of the appellant. Appellant in his petition
urges that no finding was made as to whether appellant could aid in his own defense and that no inquiry was made into the matter (R-6).
First of all, respondent points out that the complaint for a sanity inquiry filed by the District Attorney of the Fifth Judicial District alleged that an inquiry was necessary into the sanity of the appellant because of appellant's "inability to talk or to
answer questions relative to said [murder J
charges" (Exhibit D-23). It appears therefore, that
at the very outset of the proceedings in District
Court appellant's communicative problems were
recognized.
Likewise, at the first hearing to determine the
mental condition of the appellant, transcribed as exhibit D-3, Dr. Kiger, a psychiatrist, was specifically
questioned as to appellant's ability to aid in his own
defense (D-3, page 9, line 22). Dr. Kiger had previously testified that appellant was not legally insane. It
is also beyond question that the court was aware
of the problem of communicating with appellant
(D-3, page 12). At this same hearing Dr. James R.
Whitten was questioned at great length as to appellant's ability to narrate the details of the alleged
shooting (D-3, page 23, commencing at line 11). Dr.

5

Whitten had no opinion as to appellant's ability to
discern right from wrong (D-3, page 24). Dr. Whitten
finally was asked directly 1Arhether appellant's impaired ability to communicate might prohibit him
from aiding in his defense. This dialogue appears as
follows:
Mr. Fenton: and would it correct to say if there were
some items that might be to his benefit in his defense, that if we fail to guess and question him in
such a manner as to get some idea what he had in
mind, that we might easily miss something that
might be important to his defense?
Dr. Whitten: That's correct.
(Exhibit D-3, page 28, line 2).

During a continuation of the hearing previously
referred to, Dr. Alpine McGregor and Dr. McLaren
Ruesh testified as to their examination of appellan~
and the difficulty or facility with which one might
communicate with appellant. (Exhibit D-2, page 11;
page 17). Doctor Ruesh is specifically asked about
appellant's ability to communicate a bona fide defense to counsel. (Exhibit D-2, page 24, line 15). 1t
z1ppears forcefully and clearly in the transcripts of
these hearings (D-2, D-3) that the question of appellant's ability to aid in his defense was constantly
before the court during these extensive hearings.
To conclude otherwise is to disregard clear proof.
Judge C. Nelson Day, of the Fifth Judicial District, was called to testify in the instant case and
testified as to the foctors he considered in issuing
the order finding appellant sane and able to stand
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trial (TR. 286). Judge Day, when asked to explain
the meaning of his statement that appellant "is and
was at the time of the commission of this crime sufficiently and mentally aware and capable to warrant
the submission of the matter to a jury." (D-2, page 25),
stated:
"What I intended by that statement to which you
have referred and which I just read was to mean that
Mr. Bryant was within the meaning of the law mentally capable of participating in his own defense, assisting in that regard that he was within the meaning of the law not psychotic or insane either at the
time of the commission of the offense or thereafter,
particularly at that time." (TR. 186).

Based upon the testimony and the other evidence before the Court, Judge Leonard Elton, of the
Third Judicial District issued a conclusion of law
stating petitioner had been found after hearing to
be legally sane, and further, was found to be able
to communicate with his counsel and aid in his own
defense. (R-62, 63). To have done otherwise would
have been clearly unreasonable.
Respondent has no argument with the authorities cited by appellant to the effect that a determination should be made as to the accused's capacity
to comprehend his position, to understand the na·
ture and object of the proceedings against him and
to conduct his defense in a rational manner, and to
cooperate with his counsel to the end that any available defense may be interposed. We further agree
that this determination is distinct from a determination of sanity as it relates to criminal responsibility.
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We only point out that the record abounds with evidence that the distinct issue of mental ability to
stand trial was before the court, in the Fifth Judicial
District, from the outset of the proceedings against
accused and that a determination was made in this
connection even by the standards and definitions
appellant now urges on this court.
It was appellant's burden in the instant case to
bear the burden of showing with clear and convincing proof that he had been denied due process of
law by the actions of the court. This he has not done,
and the trial court in the instant case correctly refused to grant the relief prayed for under the petition. (R. 62, 63, 64) (Scott v. Beckstead, supra.)

Appellant argues that the court improperly considered the testimony of Judge Day during the hearing in the instant case, wherein the Judge explained
the factors he considered in making the disputed
finding. Appellant has not given this court the benefit of his reasoning or research as to why Judge Day
should not be permitted to elaborate on his order
or why certain selected documents (D-2, page 25;
TR. 186; and D-23 MINUTE ENTRY dated December
10, 1963) should constitute the sole evidence of the
basis of Judge Day's ruling. (Brief of appellant, page
22). Apparently appellant is only displeased with
the content not the admissibility of such testimony.
Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966), cited by
appellant on page 33 of his brief, has no application
to the instant case. In the Pate case the trial court
refused to allow a continuance of several hours dur-
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ing triai to obtain expert psychiatric testimony as to
the defendant's present insanity. This was after extensive testimony had been received during the
trial concerning the defendant's prior history of irrational behavior. The United States Supreme Court
agreed with the Circuit Court of Appeals that defendant was not given a fair opportunity to develop
facts on the issue of competency as required by
due process of the law. In the instant case, two exhaustive hearings were held on appellant's competency to stand trial; therefore, the problem of the
waiver of such required hearing is not before this
court as it was in the Pate case, nor does respc:: :lent
urge such a position in the instant case. The issue
of competency to stand trial was properly raised
and thoroughly adjudicated prior to the entry of appellant's guilty plea to a lesser charge. We submit
there was nothing for appellant to waive by his plea
simply because he had received all to which he was
entitled in the determinations at the mental hearings.
CONCLUSION
The record clearly indicates a concern for the
rights of the appellant and a recognition of his admitted physical limitations. The sanity hearings
demonstrate a thoughtful, patient and judicious consideration of all aspects of the appellant's competency to stand trial by the Fifth District Court. The
trial court in considering the issues raised by appellant in the instant case properly found a sufficient
evidentiary basis to sustain the Fifth District Court's
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order holding the appellant for trial. This court
should affirm the trial court's findings and order
and afford finality to the obviously just determination of competency.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
GERALD G. GUNDRY
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

